

Intra-Party Politics and Public Opinion: How Candidate Selection Processes affect Citizens' Satisfaction with Democracy

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Abstract

Scholars often mention the centrality of parties for the democratic political system. Indeed political parties are indispensable institutions for the linkage between state and society, and should not remain absent in any comparative analysis of citizens' political attitudes. Yet, only rarely do scholars study how parties shape people's opinion about democracy. This article seeks to amend this lacuna and examine empirically how party level characteristics, specifically the nature of a party's candidate selection procedure, relate to the level of satisfaction with democracy among citizens. The authors constructed a cross-national dataset with data on the selection procedures of 130 political parties in 28 country-sessions to examine whether citizens that vote for democratically organized parties are more satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Additionally, this relationship is examined more closely in Israel and Belgium, two countries where candidate selection procedures show substantial variation and where politicians have made a strong claim for intraparty democratization. Both the cross-national as well as the country-specific analyses indicate that democratic candidate selection are indeed associated with greater satisfaction with democracy.

Keywords: Satisfaction with democracy, Candidate selection processes, Israel, Belgium, Multilevel analysis

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Introduction

"Likud members are the best arranging committee we have, and they are the ones who are going to select the Likud list for the next Knesset. One of the main problems in the current Knesset is that about 80 Knesset Members were not selected in democratic selections and they have almost no responsiveness to the public but rather to the person or rabbi that nominated them. Likud cannot make others' mistakes." (MK Ardan, Ynet, 15/11/2007)⁴

Scholars often mention the centrality of parties for the democratic political system, the electoral process and the legislative arena. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of representative democracy without political parties as a fundamental organizational feature. Political parties are essential for preference aggregation and elite recruitment and constitute the meso-level in representative democracies: they are indispensable institutions for the linkage between state and society, and should not remain absent in any comparative analysis of political attitudes of citizens. Yet, only rarely do scholars study how parties shape people's opinion about democracy. This paper, based on a cross-national comparative dataset of parties' candidate selection methods, examines the effect of democratic intraparty candidate selection processes on citizens' political attitudes, specifically citizens' satisfaction with democracy.

There is a strong claim that, when citizens have high levels of satisfaction with democracy representative democracies profit. Indeed, democratic political culture is often considered a crucial asset for democratic political systems. Over the years, political attitudes of citizens and its determinants have drawn considerable research attention (e.g., Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Clarke & Acock, 1989). Some studies on this topic inspect individual-level determinants of political attitudes such as gender, age, education, political sophistication and income, while others also add a number of macro-level institutional causes of political attitudes, such as the electoral system (Blais &

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Dobrzynska, 1998; Anderson, 1998; Anderson & Guillory, 1997) or economic performance (Lipset & Schneider, 1987; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Van Deth & Elff, 2004). What remains to be under-researched, however, is the impact of political parties on citizens' views on democracy and politics.

The nexus between parties and citizens' perceptions about democracy is important especially in times of partisan de-alignment where partisan attachments are in decline and people's satisfaction with democracy, trust and support for institutions deteriorate (Dalton, 1996; Dalton, 1999; Mishler & Rose, 1997). Indeed, democratic selection procedures were adopted by some parties exactly as a mean to increase democratic legitimacy and the appearance of fairness, while attracting new members so as "to strengthen members' and voters' sense of involvement in party affairs" (Ashiagbor, 2008).

Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. We first, extend the literature that examines the effect of democratic institutions and their functioning by examining how intra-party institutions affect citizens' perceptions towards democracy. Similar to many other scholars (e.g., Anderson & Guillory, 1997), we combine institutional level information with individual public opinion data but we add the political party level as an additional explanatory layer.

Second, we try to systematically solve a controversy in the literature whereby some argue that democratization of selection processes has positive consequences (Cross, 1996; Norell, 2008) while others emphasize their negative impacts (Kernell, 2013). We focus on one specific arena of conflict—that of opinion towards democracy—and try to empirically verify whether democratic candidate selection processes are associated with increased citizens' satisfaction with democracy, or whether democratic selection procedures bring inner-party divisions and disagreements to the public forefront, causing citizens' satisfaction with democracy to decrease. Indeed the theoretical literature disagrees about the effect of candidate selections on political attitudes. On the one hand, it is often argued that political parties could actively increase political interest and participatory levels by democratizing candidate or leadership selection procedures and giving members and citizens a voice in the political recruitment process (Shapira, Kenig & Itzkovitch-Malka, 2010). Democratic selection processes, and especially primaries will increase participation, strengthen competitiveness, improve representation as

parliament members will be responsive and accountable to the wider electorate, who voted for them (Kenig, 2012), reinforce procedural fairness and boost legitimacy. In this manner, parties could perform the role of democratic attitude-promoters, which would be a strong argument in favor of democratically organized political parties. On the other hand, some scholars contended that democratized selection procedures should intensify intra-party competition, unveil intra-party disagreements and lead to greater distrust in parties and dissatisfaction with democracy (Kernell, 2013). In this paper, we empirically examine whether democratic candidate selection procedures are positively or negatively associated with citizen's views about democracy.

We empirically address these issues in two steps. First, we begin by studying whether and how democratized candidate selection processes affect citizens' overall satisfaction with democracy. To this end we use a cross-national analysis, estimating a three-level hierarchical model, where individual respondents are nested within parties, which in turn are nested within countries. The analysis is based on a cross-national comparative dataset containing information on 130 parties' candidate selection methods from 28 different country-sessions worldwide. We use various cross-national public opinion surveys (CSES, WVS, EVS, Afrobarometer, Latino Barometro and ESS) to measure citizens' satisfaction with democracy. The hierarchical model enables us to properly measure parties' candidate selection procedures at the party level (Shomer, 2014; Hazan & Rahat, 2010), while controlling for individual, party and country level characteristics. We find support that democratization of selection processes, and specifically, increasing the scope of the electorate positively relates to citizens' satisfaction levels with democracy.

In a second step, we further verify and strengthen the validity of this finding using two case studies: Belgium and Israel. Both systems enjoy a relatively large number of viable parties which present variation in their selection methods. This cross-party, as well as cross-temporal, variation enables us to ascertain, within each case separately, whether and how selection procedures affect satisfaction with democracy, and to account for potential alternative explanations that the cross-national analysis is not fit to deal with. Moreover, in both countries it was parties and politicians themselves that argued in favor of democratized selection processes by mentioning their desirability

for democratic legitimacy. In the beginning of the 1990s, reporters and politicians observed a sharp decline in regime trust among Belgian citizens. At the time, former Flemish liberal party leader—Guy Verhofstadt—clearly believed that this gap between citizens and the Belgian political elite could be overcome by reforming some of the country's institutional structures. Specifically with regards to candidate selection, he stated that "[parties] should no longer be able to autonomously decide who gets selected as candidate and who gets dismissed. Theoretically, every citizen is able to run for election, but in practice no one stands a chance of getting elected without a decent position on the party list. Unfortunately, voters are not able to decide on these party list positions. Citizens have absolutely no control over the electoral chances of candidates. [...]. Like in the United States, Belgium needs real primary elections. Citizens that register on the party's voter list, should get the opportunity to exclusively determine the composition of the party candidate list" (Verhofstadt, 1991)." In Israel the education minister, Gideon Saar, said in the notional youth rally to commemorate Yitzhak Rabin that "parties that do not hold primaries hurt democracy". In critiquing parties that do not use primaries Saar said that "unfortunately many parties in Israel do not hold democratic procedures to select their Knesset candidates. When the party list is chosen by a non-democratic process", said Saar, "it erodes the democratic dimension of the political system as a whole" (Karni, 2012).

We, therefore, use Israel and Belgium as a variant of a "nested analysis" that enables us to "assess the plausibility of the observed statistical relationships between variables" found in the cross-national analysis (Lieberman, 2005). Specifically, we examine 3 consecutive legislative sessions (2003-2013) for Israel and 5 consecutive sessions (1995-2014) for Belgium, and using a two-level hierarchical model we strengthen the internal validity and consequently the support for the hypothesis that voters who vote for parties that select via more democratic selection processes possess higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.

It is important to stress that the findings do not demonstrate that democratization of selection processes **causes** positive attitudes towards democracy. Rather we find support for an association between democratization of selection procedures and positive evaluations of democratic performance. In the conclusion we provide future research ideas for establishing causality.

In the next part of the paper, we summarize the most important explanatory factors of citizens' satisfaction with democracy mentioned in the literature. Subsequently, we focus on the role of political parties in this story. The literature on party decline and innovation mentions that parties with declining membership figures often turn to internal democratization to revitalize levels of trust and political interest (Scarrow, Webb & Farrell, 2000; Leduc, 2001). We link this claim with the literature on candidate selection methods and present how the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the level of decentralization are expected to influence satisfaction levels. The subsequent section delineates the hierarchical structure of the data, and presents the method used to estimate the models. The results section discusses the effect of selection procedures on satisfaction with democracy, and the concluding part puts these results into theoretical perspective and presents future directions for research.

Satisfaction with Democracy

Citizens' democratic attitudes and political culture are quintessential elements for any democratic system (Geissel, 2008). The democratic nature of countries is not only determined by democratically organized institutional models, but also by the specific attitudes of its citizens towards democracy and politics in general. Studies identify several theoretical mechanisms to explain satisfaction with democracy: cultural, institutional, sociological, cognitive, and rational (Bratton et al. 2005). Huang, Chang & Chu (2008) focus on modernization theories, hypothesizing that citizens with modernized characteristics will tend to critique their democracy and be less satisfied with it. Anderson and Guilleroy (1997) look at 11 European democracies and find that the level of consensuality conditions the effect of being in the minority or the majority on a citizen's satisfaction levels. Specifically they show that losers are less satisfied than winners. And also, that losers in consensual countries are more satisfied with democracy than losers in majoritarian democracies.

Indeed, ample research has been devoted to study the determinants of satisfaction with democracy and previous studies mostly focus on the effects of country-level determinants (institutional, cultural and economic) and individual respondents' characteristics when explaining cross-national variation in democratic satisfaction. Of all the country level aspects believed to impact

democratic attitudes, the electoral system has probably received the highest amount of research attention. It appears there are several electoral mechanisms at work which might affect citizens' democratic attitudes. It has been argued that through their effect on citizens' involvement, representation (Bowler, Lanoue & Savoie, 1994), levels of trust (Miller & Listhaug, 1990; Lijphart, 1999), and sense of efficacy, proportional representation systems enhance citizens' satisfaction with democracy (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; Anderson, 1998). Yet, Aarts and Thomassen (2008) discover a negative relationship between PR systems and satisfaction with democracy, and similarly other authors find no positive association between the number of represented political parties and efficacy as they challenge the positive effect of PR systems on democratic attitudes (Karp & Banducci, 2008). District Magnitude (DM) is an additional important feature of electoral systems which affect citizen's democratic attitudes, since it determines the nature of the linkage between voters and their representatives.

Apart from the electoral system, other country level predictors come into play as well. The age of the democratic system has an impact on the level of satisfaction with democracy such that older democracies experience greater satisfaction (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008, but see: Huang, Chang & Chu, 2008). Governmental performance is also an important determinant of attitudes towards democracy (Dalton, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2001). Typically, performance is operationalized and measured in two distinct ways: first, most studies include a number of objective aggregate-level performance measures such as GDP per capita, inflation, civil liberties and political rights levels, and corruption levels (Norris, 2011). Indeed a country's economic performance has been linked to citizens' political attitudes (Wagner, Schneider & Halla, 2009). Thus, analogous to voting behavior, attitudes on democracy and the political system are indeed also influenced by the economic situation, usually measured in terms of inflation, unemployment rate or GDP per capita. Additionally, corruption levels have been found to influence various forms of political attitudes (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). Second, studies typically include micro-level perception or evaluation of performance, such as perceived corruption levels, perceived fairness and governmental responsiveness and perception of

representational functions (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Önnudóttir & Harðarson, 2011) as measures of governmental performance.

In addition to country-level determinants and evaluations of governmental performance, citizens' individual characteristics also shape their satisfaction with democracy. Besides the usual independent variables such as age, gender and individual economic circumstances, the literature has repeatedly stressed the importance of political sophistication, respondents' self-ideological placement and their educational levels for forming political attitudes (Niemi, Craig & Mattei, 1991; Dalton, 2008; Myunghee, 2009).

What about Parties?

As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the impact of the party-level has rarely been considered in the large majority of studies on political attitudes. The existing literature largely ignores the fact that political parties vary in their behavior and electoral strategies, and that citizens might be affected by these interparty-differences.

One of the notable exceptions is the work of Paskeviciute & Anderson (2003), who linked citizens to parties and differentiated those parties on the basis of their goals. Their results show that the level of support for the political system in general, and political parties in particular strongly varies according to party type. Anderson (1998) examined the impact of party and party system performance in mobilizing citizens' support on satisfaction with democracy. He found that party performance was the best indicator of differences in satisfaction across democracies.

But what about other characteristics such as the internal organization of political parties? Authors have largely neglected to theorize and empirically test this type of party-level determinant while studying citizens' political attitudes. This is surprising, since the literature on intraparty democracy often implicitly refers to the possible effects of democratic intra-party selection processes on levels of participation, trust in parties, and satisfaction with democracy by deeming a party trustworthy in the eyes of citizens (Levi & Stoker, 2000). In what follows, we review this literature and formulate a

number of hypotheses about the effects of intra-party democracy on citizens' satisfaction with democracy.

Candidate selections' effect on citizens' satisfaction with democracy

Recruitment and selection of political elites is one of the most important activities of political parties. Indeed, in recent decades party scholars have started to produce a great deal of literature on various aspects of this topic. First, the evolution of candidate selection methods has been studied extensively, both in single-country and cross-national studies (e.g. Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Bille, 2001; Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008). Second, researchers examined the determinants of candidate selection processes (Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014), and lastly research focused on the effect selection processes have on the political arena for example, on intra-party representation (Hazan & Rahat, 2010) or legislators' behavior and party unity (Shomer, 2009; Akirav, 2010; Hix, 2004).

Across most of the literature, scholars utilize Hazan's and Rahat's analytical framework of candidate selection processes (Hazan & Rahat, 2001; 2010), which disentangles four dimensions of candidate selection, among which level of *decentralization* and inclusiveness of the *selectorate* are the most important ones. We focus in this paper on these two dimensions.

Parties have experimented with several remedies to amend the perceived decline in their status, manifested by decline in partisan attachment and trust (Van Biezen, Mair & Poguntke, 2012). One of those remedies is to democratize internal decision-making procedures, for example by opening up candidate selection processes to wider selectorates and by adopting membership votes for party leadership selections (Bille, 2001; Hazan, 2002; Scarrow, Webb & Farrell, 2000; Leduc, 2001; Cross & Pilet, 2014). Yet, democratizing candidate selection procedures and opening it to a larger body of selectorate might bare both positive and negative consequences for citizens' perceptions on parties and democracy more generally. We hypothesize both alternatives, and subject the opposing hypotheses to empirical analysis to determine whether democratized selection processes bare positive or negative effects on democratic attitudes. On the one hand, democratic candidate selection processes were

designed to bring citizens back in the political process by increasing responsiveness, transparency and party membership appeal (Cross, 1996; Scarrow, 1999). The literature on the effect of institutions on satisfaction tells us that procedural **fairness** and **transparent** procedures encourage and promote positive evaluations (Miller & Listhaug, 1999). Democratized candidate selection processes, and especially primaries, are perceived as a more fair procedure than selection in smoked filled back rooms and they are clearly more transparent (De-Luca et al., 2002). Indeed by increasing the scope of the selectorate and ultimately adopting primaries, parties signal that members and voters are welcome to voice their opinion in intra-party matters, as they open up the "black box" and increase transparency and accountability. Consequently, party democratization is a way to give party members and voters an opportunity to have a democratic voice, and for that voice to be heard. Indeed the will to give voters a voice might be a plausible explanation for the increasing number of democratic intra-party reforms (Scarrow, 1996).⁵

Mikulska and Scarrow (2008) found in the U.K. that inclusive selectorates are associated with higher congruence between representatives and voters. Democratic selections might also encourage citizens to participate not only in the selection stage but also on election day. Indeed, Norell (2008) found that party democratization has a positive effect on voter turnout and satisfaction with democracy in European elections, and there is some evidence that open primary elections lead to higher voter turnout (Calcagno & Westley, 2008; Clausen, 2009). Involvement in intra-party decision-making processes makes voters believe that their opinion matters, ultimately improving citizens' attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy. Democratic selection processes' effect on satisfaction with democracy, thus, works via their effect on voters' perception of parties and/or voters' perception of their own efficacy. When parties democratize their selection processes, voters' perceptions of the process as fair and transparent intensify, and their efficacy levels increase as they are given the chance and ability to select candidates (even if they do not take up the opportunity and actually participate in the process). As voters' perceptions of parties' image improve, and voters' perceptions of their own efficacy increase, voters' satisfaction levels increase as well.

⁵ Of course, parties may sometimes have other reasons to undertake these reforms, such as severe electoral defeat (Hopkin, 2001; Pennings & Hazan, 2001).

In line with these arguments, one could expect more inclusive candidate selection methods to enhance satisfaction with democracy. Hence, our first hypothesis states:

***H1a.** Inclusive candidate selection methods are associated with greater satisfaction with democracy among citizens.*

While some scholars present potential positive consequences for enlarging the scope of the selectorate, others argue that intra-party democratization efforts often do not lead to the desired effects. For instance, democratic changes in party leadership selection has not been found to have a positive effect on political participation, nor did it lead to higher levels of competition among candidates (Carty & Blake, 1999; Kenig, 2008). Furthermore, the representativeness of parties is claimed to have been lower in candidate selection procedures with more inclusive selectorates (Spies & Kaiser, 2012; Rahat, Hazan & Katz, 2008) as the ability to balance the ticket is greater the more exclusive the selectorate is (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). Some scholars argue that party elites who appear to open up their procedures for members and voters, in fact try to manipulate intra-party democracy for their own ends (Marsh, 1993; Mair, 1994).

Kernell (2013) examines 20 democracies and finds that voters are less likely to vote for parties that select by the voters rather than by party leadership. One of the explanations she gives relates to intra-party factionalism. Kernell claims that when voters are involved in selection processes they are more aware of the internal disagreements and struggles within the party than they would have been in cases the party selected via leadership: "when voters are more educated about internal party divisions they may be less likely to identify with a party's platform or to show up at the polls (129)". On a similar vein, Hazan and Rahat (2010) argue that exclusive selection processes lead to the lowest levels of intra-party competition, which in turn, minimize potential voters' exposure to intra-party conflicts. More inclusive selectorates encourage competition, which exacerbates intra-party divisions. These divisions might harm a party's reputation and decrease citizens' trust in parties, the parliament and

their overall satisfaction with democracy⁶. When democratic selection processes intensify competition and disagreements and reduces unity levels, citizens' perceptions of parties decline and consequently their overall satisfaction levels with democracy. As party's image declines, voters' satisfaction levels decrease as well (see a similar argument made by Leiter and Clark (2015), who argue that when governing parties' image with regards to important valance characteristics (e.g., unity, integrity and competence) declines, citizens' satisfaction with democracy decline as well).

Greene and Haber (2015) examine how parties' intra-party disagreements affect citizens' evaluation of parties and citizens' vote choice. The authors claim that personal vote seeking incentives increase voter's perceptions about parties' disagreements as it facilitates intra-party heterogeneity in voting behavior in parliament. These intra-party disagreements, argue Greene and Haber, negatively affect citizens' evaluation of parties, and affect their vote choice on election-day. Increasing the scope of the selectorate and democratizing the process intensify personal vote seeking incentives as candidates have to compete against their co-partisans (Shomer, 2009; Crisp, 2007). This intensified intra-party competition may lower levels of party cohesion and party unity (Hazan & Rahat, 2006; Rahat, 2007), and increase the likelihood voters will perceive the party as suffering from internal divisions and disagreements. Moreover, in the context of intra-party competition, negative campaign may further signal voters the internal party divisions. Under these circumstances, voters may form negative evaluations of parties that use democratized selection processes, effectively reducing their overall level of democratic satisfaction.

H1b. *Inclusive candidate selection methods are associated with lower satisfaction with democracy among citizens.*

As mentioned earlier, the second dimension examined in this paper is selection processes' decentralization levels. This dimension describes the party level that is in control of the candidate selection process and has less to do with the level of democratization within parties per se (Hazan & Rahat, 2010), and therefore we suspect it will play a less crucial role in affecting citizens' evaluations

⁶ Note that Hazan and Rahat (2010) actually advocates a curvilinear relationship whereby exclusive selectorates promotes the lowest levels of competitions, primaries promotes medium range competition levels, and party delegates correlates with the highest levels of competition.

of democracy. Despite this suspicion, we again formulate two opposing hypotheses on the effect of this second dimension, and allow the data to determine whether and how it affects democratic attitudes

On the one hand, as selection takes place with a decentralized mechanism, voters might feel their own local geographic interests are being preserved compared to selection processes which take place at a national level, which are by definition more remote from the voters themselves. Indeed, Hazan (1999) argues that the introduction of some decentralized elements in Labour's and Likud's candidate selection processes prior to the 14th Israeli Knesset elections, added local dimension in an otherwise unitary system, and enabled a geographical political representation that did not exist prior to it. He concluded that candidates competing in the decentralized process, geared their campaign, and their post electoral behaviors towards a particular geographically concentrated group of voters. Based on this logic one might expect that:

***H2a.** Decentralized candidate selection methods are associated with greater satisfaction with democracy among citizens.*

While decentralized selection processes may bring about positive implications and improves citizens' democratic attitudes, decentralization may also unveil intra-party disagreements across the geographical units, and between the national and local dimension of the party, and hence generate distrust in parties and dissatisfaction with democracy in general. Indeed, Hazan (1999) argues that in interviews, party officials admitted that when the decision to include constituencies in the primaries was approved, "the possibility of local interests coming into conflict with national party interests was a factor that they failed to address" (800). Similarly, Sieberer (2006) found decentralized processes to be associated with lower levels of Rice Scores compared to centralized selection processes⁷. Moreover, previous research has shown that high levels of decentralization in candidate selection breeds low competition between candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010), which means that incumbent legislators do not have to face serious intraparty contenders in their districts. This might foster citizens' perception

⁷ Yet, others argued that decentralized procedures do not necessarily encourage disunity (see: Hazan and Rahat, 2010, p. 158).

that political parties are oligarchically structured organizations with dangerously low levels of turnover, and consequently lower citizens' satisfaction levels with democracy.

H2b. Decentralized candidate selection methods are associated with lower satisfaction with democracy among citizens.

Data and method

We use both cross-national as well as case studies to examine whether and how democratized candidate selection procedures associates with satisfaction with democracy. For the cross-national three-level hierarchical model we built an original dataset on the political attitudes of 21,805 citizens nested in 130 political parties, from 28 country-sessions (see the appendix for more details)⁸. Samples were derived from numerous cross-national public opinion surveys, complemented by a smaller number of national election studies⁹.

Data on intra-party candidate selection processes is scarce, especially since its appropriate level of measurement is at a given party in a given legislative term (Hazan & Voerman, 2006). Finding surveys that correspond (in terms of countries and years) to the parties for which we were able to collect selection data was also challenging. Moreover, in order to link individual respondents to parties we had to use items about their party preferences hence we used "who did you vote for in the previous

⁸ Combining datasets between various comparative surveys is a reasonable approach, however the reader should be cautioned that design effects do differ across international surveys. For example, while the CSES are post-election surveys taking place not long after the election, the other comparative surveys used in this analysis deal with a broader set of human values and research themes. Thus, for some of the country years used in the analysis, the data collection process took place longer after the elections and candidate selection processes under investigation occurred. Despite these differences, we argue that the similarities between the various studies are strong. First, the question wording and response scale for the satisfaction with democracy item (our dependent variable) is similar for all surveys (except for the Israel 1999 country session in ESS, where a 0-10 scale was recoded to 4 point scale). Second, studying the methodological notes and reports for each of the comparative surveys boosts confidence that their resulting datasets can be combined. In terms of sampling, mostly equivalent sampling plans have been followed where multistage sampling has been used: primary units were localities (e.g. counties, regions, municipalities), selected according to their population size. In a second step, secondary units (individual respondents) were randomly selected within the primary units (e.g. on the basis of electoral registers). In sum, the reported minor differences do not outweigh the advantages of combining these comparative survey datasets. As Norris (2009) puts it, "when large-scale multi-national surveys covering many societies are combined with systematic variations in institutional and societal contexts, this process is capable of providing powerful insights for the study of comparative politics.

⁹ In order to estimate the effect of institutional determinants and selection procedures on the attitudes of citizens, we first, needed to make sure that the surveys were taken after the election (for which the selection of candidate took place) and the start of the parliamentary term. At that moment, candidate selection procedures already took place and survey respondents' attitudes could have been influenced by it.

election?" (found in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and European Social Survey (ESS)) or "who would you vote for if there were elections tomorrow/this week" (found in the World Values Survey (WVS), European Values Study (EVS), Afrobarometer and Latin Barometer). Yet, unfortunately the surveys for many country-sessions did not ask either of these questions, so establishing this link, and nesting respondents within parties was impossible for them.

In light of all these considerations, cases for the cross-national analysis were not chosen randomly, but rather based on data availability. Nonetheless, our sample of countries is diverse as it includes both established as well as new democracies (a characteristic we control for in the analysis) and our sample of parties spans the variation of selection procedures from parties that use extremely exclusive selectorates to those that adopt primaries. Additionally, the selection of cases into the analysis is not correlated with either the outcome variable or any of the predictors, and we are confident the results we obtain are not biased by the difficulties of selecting cases.

In light of the cross-national analysis' pitfalls, we supplement it with two case studies—Israel and Belgium—that enable us to further test and explain the theoretical mechanism that underlies the hypotheses and evaluate the validity of the cross-national's empirical findings.¹⁰ The addition of the Belgian and Israeli cases enables us to employ a variant of a "nested analysis" (Lieberman, 2005), that help us gain additional insights on the research question; analyze rival explanations; and ascertain the internal validity of our argument. Specifically, we use Israel and Belgium to, first, control for additional individual variables (e.g., education and income) and party level characteristics (e.g., party switching), so as to analyze rival explanations, which the literature identifies as central to explaining variation in satisfaction with democracy, and for which we could not control in the cross-national analysis in light of data availability concerns. Thus, analyzing Israeli parties while controlling for intra-legislative party switching enables us to ascertain that the relationship between selection processes and satisfaction with democracy are not spurious. Likewise, the fact that the relationship between democratic selection processes and high levels of satisfaction with democracy gains support

¹⁰ For the first three Belgian country sessions, we used data from the General Election Study Belgium, carried out by the Pole Interuniversitaire Opinion public et Politique (PIOP) and the Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek Opinieonderzoek (ISPO). For the last two country sessions, ESS data on Belgian citizens was downloaded. With regard to the Israeli case study we used the Israel Democracy Institute's Israeli Democracy Index surveys.

in Belgium and Israel in a more detailed model specification, helps us gain confidence in the main findings of the study. Second, we use the fact that some parties in Israel and Belgium exhibit cross-temporal variation in their selection procedures to further supplement our internal validity and help us analyze rival explanations. We show that supporters of parties that altered their selection processes over the years did indeed experience changes in their levels of satisfaction with democracy in the hypothesized direction, e.g., as the party democratized its selection processes its supporters expressed higher levels of satisfaction¹¹. We shift the level of analysis to parties as we follow one of Lieberman's recommendations for a "nested analysis", i.e., that the case study analysis will require "an examination of *within*-case processes and/or variation" (440). Of course one needs keep in mind the limitations for external validity and generalizability concerns that accompany any case study analysis. Nonetheless, we believe the combination of the cross-national analysis with the two case studies lend support for the main hypotheses of the paper.

Figure 1 about here.

We operationalize satisfaction with democracy using the question 'on the whole are you very satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing in our country?' To ease interpretation we reverse the order of the four category Likert scale such that 1 signifies 'not at all satisfied' and 4 stands for very satisfied¹². Figure 1 presents the distribution of satisfaction with democracy in the 28 country-sessions included in the analysis.

The key predictor in the analysis refers to parties' candidate selection processes. It is a party level phenomenon, which measures the manner by which candidates get permission to represent the party's banner comes election days, and in some cases the process also determines the order on the ballot in which they will appear. As mentioned, we use two major criteria to analyze selection

¹¹ Additionally, we are able to anecdotally demonstrate that the positive relationship we found between democratic selections and satisfaction are not a product of a temporal dynamic such that democratic selections' negative effect on satisfaction levels are in the short run, but their positive effect is a longer term process. Hence, we use Israel's Labour party and Belgium's CVP to test the potential temporal dynamic (results are available from the authors upon request). We thank an anonymous reviewer for directing our attention to Lieberman's article.

¹² The validity of the satisfaction with democracy measure has been established and it was verified that it does not simply measure support for the incumbent government (e.g., Kornberg and Clarke (1992)).

processes: selectorate and decentralization (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). The selectorate is the body that selects the candidates, and can be composed of only one person, or several people, up to the entire electorate of the nation. This dimension can be measured on a continuum from exclusive selectorates, where a very limited group of selectors take control, to inclusive selectorates, such as the party members or the electorate. The inclusiveness of the selectorate is operationalized as an ordinal variable with three categories: 0 = small group of party leaders; 1 = party delegates; 2 = primaries.

The second analytical dimension to classify selection processes is *decentralization*. It measures the degree to which selection is devolved. It can be further differentiated into local or geographical decentralization and social decentralization (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). Geographical/territorial decentralization, measures the influence of local party branches in the candidate selection. In highly centralized methods, the national party level has complete control over the nomination process. Social decentralization ensures representation of groups such as women or unions. It is important to note, as Hazan and Rahat emphasize, that decentralization does not directly relate or refer to democratization of candidate selection processes (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). The dimension of decentralization is measured using a three category variable with 0 = national candidate selection; 1 = local candidate selection with national control or veto; 2 = local selection without national interference. To check the validity of the ordinal scales we also present models that use treatment contrast on selectorate and decentralization, each, where the base category that is excluded from the analysis is the most exclusive selectorate (0), and the most national procedure (0)¹³.

In addition to selection processes, we also control at the party level for a party's size and whether it belonged to the coalition or opposition. This latter variable controls for the winners and losers argument presented by Norris (1999b) and Anderson and Guilleroy (1997) that people who are winners and support the party in government tend to have higher satisfaction with democracy and

¹³ While intra-party variation in selection process exists, we do not address it in this paper and thus code a party's selection process according to the manner by which the majority of its MPs were selected. Additionally, we emphasize that many parties use complex-multi staged procedures to select their candidates (see Hazan and Rahat, 2010). While our 3 point scales are rougher measures of inclusiveness and decentralization, they at least allow us the cross-national comparisons. A more detailed scale, which takes into consideration the complexity of the selection (like the 25 points scale of selectorate presented by Hazan and Rahat (2010)) are less suitable for such cross-national comparisons.

higher levels of institutional trust. At the Belgian and Israeli case study analyses, we are also able to control for the party's ideology, whereby -1 represent right wing parties, +1 represents left parties, and 0 represent center parties.

At the country level (for the cross-national analyses) we control for several predictors. To begin with, and to mimic its centrality in the literature on the effect of institutions on political attitudes, we include 2 indicators for electoral systems. Thus, we control for the average district magnitude (AVDM), where a country's average is a weighted average of the various district magnitudes, with weights determined by how many legislators run in districts of each size. Since DM determines the nature of the linkage between voters and their legislators, we expect the effect of DM on democratic attitudes to take a curvilinear form. Citizens electing legislators in SMD, where DM equals one, feel that they are able to hold their legislator accountable as it is very clear who is responsible for guarding the district's political interests. As a result, important democratic attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy are expected to be relatively high. As DM increases, however, citizens have less clear linkages with legislators and the ability to hold them accountable becomes more problematic. This decreased accountability might have detrimental effects on democratic attitudes. Yet in very large electoral districts, this negative effect might be neutralized for two reasons. First, as mentioned, in electoral systems with high DM, a larger group of citizens feel that their political interests are represented by at least one of the elected legislators from their district. So while high levels of DM decreases accountability, it increases representation of voters' preferences. Second, in very high levels of DM, the level of electoral competition intensifies as the effective number of parties increases (Taagepara & Shugart, 1993). This intensified competition might foster democratic satisfaction among citizens. Hence, we also include a squared term of AVDM to allow for the possibility of a curvilinear relationship. Second, we follow Anderson (1998), among others, who argues that proportional electoral systems are linked to higher levels of support, and we therefore control for electoral system types using Lundell and Karvonen's (2003) classification. Following their operationalization, we distinguish six categories of electoral systems: 1 = closed party lists; 2 = systems with single-member districts; 3 = mixed systems; 4 = Strong preferential voting systems; 5 =

Weak preferential voting systems; 6 = No vote pool at party level systems, where the reference group excluded from the model and to which all results should be compared to is closed party lists (CLPR systems).

Since scholars found satisfaction with democracy levels to be affected by political performance and especially on the economic dimension we include in the cross-national analysis an objective aggregate-level measure of economic performance: GDP per capita obtained from the World Bank¹⁴. Additionally, we created a binary variable 'new democracy', to indicate which countries are considered 'free' according to Freedom House for a period of less than 20 years. Countries with over 20 years of uninterrupted freedom are then considered old democracies. This cut-off point has previously been applied by Karp and Banducci (2007).

The literature on satisfaction with democracy points to several individual level control variables we wish to account for, such as age, gender, education, ideology and sophistication. However, some of these indicators were simply not asked by many surveys and would have resulted in a dramatic reduction of the sample size in the individual, party as well as the country-session levels.

14 The on-line appendix contains a model with an additional aggregate-level measure of governmental performance: corruption levels. Unfortunately, while the literature clearly identifies citizens' micro-level subjective governmental performance evaluations as a key determinant of their satisfaction with democracy, this type of data is simply not available for many of the country-years we study, or are not comparable across surveys. Table d in the on-line appendix contains a model that controls for economic development (in addition to the single measure of GDP per capita): a 3-years GDP average growth in percentages (data was calculated using the variable *rgdpna* from the Penn tables). In order to calculate the 3-years average for each country-session, we took 3 years prior to the election year (+ the election year), and calculated the difference between the GDP for each year and the previous year and divided it by the previous year (3 times for each country-session in the study). Thus, for example, for Argentina 2005, we calculated $(\text{GDP}_{2003} - \text{GDP}_{2002}) / \text{GDP}_{2002}$, and did the same for 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. That gave us the annual change in GDP. We then calculated the average of the 3 of them to obtain a 3 year GDP average growth (in percentage terms). The table in the appendix reveals that the main results of the paper did not change, namely the positive relationship between democratic selectorate and satisfaction with democracy. Neither did results for GDP/capita or new-democracies, or any party and individual level covariates change. Interestingly, and as expected, controlling for all other covariates, economic development is positively correlated with satisfaction with democracy. Nonetheless, the inclusion of the growth measurement did alter the effect of some of the electoral system variables on satisfaction levels. Thus, in the current model neither citizens in SMD systems nor citizens in Mixed systems exhibit differing levels of satisfaction with democracy compared to respondents who live in CLPR systems. Nonetheless, while the two coefficients lose their statistical significance, their sign remains the same as the one presented in the paper. All in all it seems the results concerning the effect of selectorate and decentralization on satisfaction are robust to the inclusion of the economic development indicator.

We therefore control, in the cross-national analysis, only for respondent's sex (0 = male, 1 = female) and age (continuous), while allowing the functional form of age to be curvilinear by adding a squared term. In the case studies we were able to also control for education and income¹⁵.

Results

Table 1 presents the three-levels HLM models in which individual respondents are nested within parties which in turn are nested within country-sessions¹⁶. The outcome variable is satisfaction with democracy. The first model uses the three category indexed version of selectorate and decentralization—the main predictors of interest—whereas the second model analyzes the data using treatment contrast on selectorate and decentralization. The second model enables verification of the validity of the index by examining which type of selection procedures specifically affect levels of satisfaction.

Table 1 about here

Clearly, the scope of the selectorate by which a party selects is correlated with citizens' satisfaction levels. According to both models, respondents who vote for a party that uses inclusive selection procedures tend, on average, to exhibit higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. This positive relationship is statistically significant at the first model at the 0.05 level. The second model further reveals that compared to the reference group of selection via party leaders, both voters who vote for parties that use party delegates and those that vote for parties that employ primaries are more

¹⁵ We were unfortunately unable to control for sophistication levels, or strength of partisan attachments. We were able to collect respondents' ideological self-placement for all country-sessions in our study except for Japan 1996. Thus, the total number of country-sessions is reduced to 27 and the total number of parties is reduced to 128. Consequently we lose 472 respondents. Moreover, while most surveys use an 11 point scale (0-10) when asking the respondent to place themselves on a left-right scale, the WVS and EVS, however, use 10 point scales (1-10). To enable comparison we merged the 0 and 1 categories from the 11 point-scale into a single category, effectively creating a 10 point scale. Table c in the on-line appendix presents the results. The substantive results are similar to the ones presented in the paper, except the effect of Mixed Member electoral systems loses its statistical significance (although the sign of the coefficient remains the same). More importantly, the effect of selectorate and decentralization is similar to the ones presented in the paper. Interestingly, we find that more right wing respondents exhibit higher levels of satisfaction. These results corroborate previous findings in the literature (Schäfer, 2013; Anderson and Singer, 2008). We further note that some researchers find a positive relationship between ideological congruence between voters and parties and voter's satisfaction levels (Myunghoe, 2009) but we simply do not have either object or subjective measures of parties' ideological position data for all the parties in our study.

¹⁶ The models presented are OLS models. We also ran Hierarchical ordered logit models, and obtained similar results, substantively, to the ones presented here. For ease of interpretation we present the Hierarchical Linear models. The ordered logit models are available in the appendix.

satisfied with democracy (significant at the 0.05 level). Substantively, compared to selecting via party leaders, selection via party delegates increases satisfaction with democracy by about 0.2 standard deviations and selection using primaries increases satisfaction by more than a quarter standard deviation¹⁷.

The cross-national analysis reveals that while the scope of the selectorate correlates with satisfaction levels, the degree of selections' decentralization bare no relationships on citizens' satisfaction with democracy. In addition, we see that being on the losing or winning side has an effect on citizens' levels of satisfaction. Voters who vote for parties that end up being in the coalition, exhibit higher satisfaction levels compared to those who support opposition parties. The results concerning the effect of electoral systems are interesting. As mentioned we use 2 different variables to tab into the various mechanisms that might explain the effect of electoral systems on political satisfaction with democracy. To begin with, we control for average district magnitude and anticipate a curvilinear relationship between DM and the outcome variable. Theoretically, we hypothesize that when DMs are low (=1), voters feel they have a representative in parliament with a direct access, which should increase levels of satisfaction with democracy. On the other hand, in systems with very large DMs the electoral map is characterized by multiple parties which might afford most voters a sense of representation, and therefore increase their satisfaction levels. In the middle range of district magnitude we hypothesize satisfaction to be the lowest. Thus we anticipate to find a negative coefficient for the AVDM variable, and a positive coefficient for the squared term. As can be seen from the results, these theoretical expectations do not gain support and we therefore conclude that controlling for all other variables (including the second operationalization of electoral systems to be discussed below), district magnitude does not have an effect on citizens' satisfaction levels.

Our second measure of electoral system is Lundell and Karvonen's preferential voting variable (Lundell & Karvonen, 2003). We use a treatment contrast with CLPR as a reference group. We find that respondents who live in countries with SMD systems have lower levels of satisfaction with democracy compared to voters who live in CLPR, all else equal (significant at a 0.1 level in both

¹⁷ The standard deviation of satisfaction with democracy is 0.75.

models). Thus, controlling for district magnitude, respondents in SMD systems are less satisfied with democracy by 0.33 (out of a 4 point scale) compared to respondents in CLPR countries. SMD systems are characterized by great disproportionality which might lead voters to be dissatisfied with the way the democratic process works¹⁸. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, two party systems have been linked to lower levels of satisfaction with democracy (Miller & Listhaug, 1990) and SMD systems highly correlate with such dual party systems (Cox, 1997). Voters in mixed member electoral systems also exhibit lower levels of satisfaction compared to voters in CLPR, and so do voters in both, strong and weak preferential list systems.

We also control at the country level for GDP per capita and new democracy. We find, as expected, that voters in countries with better economic performance are more satisfied with democracy. Yet, interestingly, we find higher levels of satisfaction in new democracies, compared to old democracies. These results corroborates Huang, Chang & Chu's (2008) finding that new democracies enjoy a solid base of support¹⁹.

As explained above, issues of data availability prohibit us from incorporating a long list of individual level predictors that are hypothesized to affect satisfaction with democracy (such as education, income levels and political sophistication). Nonetheless, with regards to the individual

¹⁸ We re-ran the analysis controlling for Gallagher Index of disproportionality. While the direction of the effect was negative, indicating that indeed voters in disproportional systems exhibit lower levels of satisfaction, the effect fails to reach statistical significance at a conventional level. Moreover, while the negative sign of the SMD coefficient remained, it, too, failed to reach statistical significance. Corruption levels have been hypothesized to affect political attitudes towards democracy (Van der Meer, 2010). The coefficient of political corruption measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index is positive, indicating that in cleaner countries citizens enjoy higher levels of satisfaction, but the results are insignificant in a conventional level. All other results in the model remained the same to the ones presented above. Lastly, regime type has been hypothesized to affect satisfaction with democracy (Huang, Chang & Chu, 2008). We ran the models while controlling for whether a country is a presidential or a parliamentary system. The regime type's coefficient was not statistically significant, while all other results remained similar to the ones presented in Table 1. All models can be found in the appendix.

¹⁹ Ideally we would have liked to verify the results using sub-sample analyses that ascertain the aggregate findings are not the product of a differing distribution of satisfaction with democracy and selection processes across old and new democracies. Unfortunately, only a small segment of our sample constitute new democratic countries (8), which result in perfect multi-collinearity among many of the covariates. Nonetheless, we re-ran the analysis excluding countries for which data was available during their transitioning to democracy period. Thus, individuals and parties were excluded if their data came from an election cycle which occurred during the first 10 years since democratization/independence. This effectively excluded Croatia, The Czech Republic (both 1996 and 1998), Hungary, Poland, Russia and Taiwan. The result are similar to the ones presented in the paper, and support the same substantive conclusion. Future research that extends the analysis to additional new-democratic countries will help shed light on this issue in the future.

predictors we see that, in line with several other studies regarding satisfaction with democracy, women are less satisfied with democracy than men (Schafer, 2013), which supports the notion that women are a weakened, sociological minority group in the society. In addition, it seems younger and older people tend to have high levels of satisfaction with democracy, while middle aged citizens seem to exhibit the lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy.

To further validate our main results concerning the correlation between candidate selection procedures and satisfaction with democracy we conducted country-specific analyses in both Belgium and Israel²⁰. Table 2 presents the results, where for Belgium we pooled 5 legislative terms and Israel we pooled 3 legislative terms to examine whether and how candidate selection procedures relates to levels of satisfaction. As with the cross-national analysis we present results from models in which selectorate and decentralization were included as indexes, as well as models in which we refer to them as categorical variables²¹.

The results for both Israel and Belgium further support the conclusion that democratic candidate selection procedures are positively correlated with satisfaction with democracy. The first two columns in Table 2 present the results for Israel, where we calculate that 8% of the variance in satisfaction with democracy is explained by party-level characteristics, and the included party-level variables account for 11% of that variation. The effect of selectorate is positive and statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Thus, increasing the selectorate by 1 unit toward a more inclusive and open process, increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy by 0.174, holding all else equal, which is about a quarter standard deviation of satisfaction with democracy. Similarly, when we use the selectorate variable as a categorical variable we find that voters who vote for parties that use primaries to select their lists exhibit satisfaction levels that are higher by 0.253 (out of a four point scale) than voters who vote for parties that use party leaders to arrange the list, that is selection via primaries increases

²⁰ We verify party switching does not cause the association we find to be spurious, by adding the covariate intra-legislative party switching to the Israeli analysis. The results (presented in Table e in the on-line appendix) demonstrate that party switching is not correlated with satisfaction with democracy and the substantive results concerning the positive relationships between selectorate and satisfaction remains.

²¹ For the Israeli models we could not include treatment contrast for both selectorate and decentralization in light of perfect multicollinearity and singularity.

satisfaction by $1/3$ standard deviations. It seems democratic candidate selection procedures are associated with positive citizens' views about democracy.

Table 2 about here

Similar to the cross-national results presented in Table 1, voters who vote for coalition parties exhibit greater satisfaction with democracy compared to voters who vote for the losing side. Specifically, in Israel voting for the coalition increases satisfaction with democracy by 0.142, which is a 0.2 standard deviation. Moreover, the results concerning age and gender also mimic the ones obtained from the cross-national analysis. Thus, it seems younger and older voters are the ones that feel the most satisfied with democracy, and that female are less satisfied than male, although this negative coefficient fails to reach statistical significance. Lastly, we find income to be positively associated, as expected, with levels of satisfaction.

The analysis for Belgium presents a similar picture. Democratized candidate selection procedures are associated with higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. A movement of one unit on the selectorate index increases satisfaction levels by 0.099 (out of a 4 point scale) holding all else constant. Moreover, the treatment contrast of selectorate reveals that the positive relationship between selectorate and satisfaction levels stems from the adoption of primaries. Indeed it is voters who vote for parties that adopt primaries that exhibit satisfaction levels higher by about $1/3$ standard deviations compared to their counterparts who vote for parties that use party leaders to choose candidates. The satisfaction levels of voters that vote for parties that use delegates and those that support parties that use leaders are indistinguishable from one another (although the point prediction is positive as well).

The Belgium case presents interesting results as we find decentralized selection processes to be negatively correlated with satisfaction with democracy. Recall that in the cross-national analysis as well as the Israeli case, decentralization did not have a significant effect on satisfaction levels. But in the Belgium case we find that voters who vote for parties that use only localized selection processes exhibit lower satisfaction levels compared to voters who vote for parties that use national level processes only. In Belgium, when local party branches control candidate selection processes, clashes

with national party headquarters are not uncommon. These intraparty tensions might give parties a bad image, decreasing citizens' trust in them as institutions and lowering their levels of satisfaction with democracy as well. In addition, as we stated above, decentralized selection processes have been associated with low levels of competition between candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010), a finding that might also explain the negative coefficient of decentralization in Belgium. Indeed, recent research on incumbent de-selection in the Belgian case shows that incumbents are significantly safer for de-selection in nationalized candidate selection processes compared to decentralized ones (author, 2015). In decentralized selection processes, incumbents are more often assigned to unrealistic list positions or de-selected altogether.

The individual level predictors also support their respective hypothesized effect and present a similar picture to the one presented by the cross-national and Israel analyses. Specifically, we again find younger and older voters to be more satisfied with democracy, and females to be less satisfied. We additionally find richer and educated Belgian voters to exhibit higher levels of satisfaction.

Using a cross-national analysis and two case studies reveals that democratized selection procedures that involve a large body of selectorate are positively related to views about democracy. Voters who support parties that use inclusive selection procedures exhibit higher satisfaction levels compared to voters who support parties that use restrictive processes.

Conclusions

Hazan and Rahat (2010) looked at three aspects of democratized candidate selection processes when assessing whether and to what degree they "serve democracy". First, they examine selection processes' effect on expression of democratic norms of competition and participation and production of democratic outputs of representation and responsiveness. Second, they examine whether and how democratized selection methods promotes power diffusion. And lastly, they ask whether democratized selections help and strengthen parties as vital organizations in a representative democracy. Our paper adds a fourth question and examine whether and how democratized selection processes "serve democracy" by promoting citizens' satisfaction levels with democracy.

In this paper we seek to empirically test whether democratic candidate selection processes affect citizens' political attitudes. It has been widely claimed by politicians, the media, as well as by some scholars that opening candidate selection procedures would result in higher levels of trust in parties and other institutions that include them like governments and parliaments, and that citizens' levels of efficacy, participation, interest in politics and overall satisfaction with democracy would increase. Indeed these reasons were sometimes quoted by politicians when debating whether to open up candidate selection methods and adopt primaries. However, to date, most research that studies political attitudes ignores the meso—party level—characteristic of candidate selection processes. Our paper amends this lacuna, moves beyond the static study of institutional difference, and takes party seriously when it uses a comprehensive cross-national analysis to verify whether indeed democratic selection processes are associated with positive citizens' attitudes.

Looking at satisfaction with democracy and using 3 level cross national varying-intercept hierarchical models, as well as 2 level hierarchical analyses in the case studies of Belgium and Israel, we show that democratized candidate selection processes foster positive political attitudes. Specifically, increasing the scope of the selectorate—the body of people who are eligible to take part in the selection procedures—increases citizens' satisfaction levels with democracy.

We emphasize that the analysis presented does not prove causation but rather association between democratic selection processes and positive democratic attitudes. To further validate causation we need to verify whether supporters of parties that altered their selection processes over time change their political attitudes in the appropriate direction. In other words, do supporters of a party that used exclusive selection process at time t exhibit lower trust and satisfaction levels compared to supporters of that same party when it uses primaries at time $t+1$. Unfortunately, we simply do not have enough data from such parties to conduct a full multivariate analysis. For now, we can anecdotally say that when the Israeli Likud party altered its intra-party selection processes in 2009, and adopted primaries (whereas prior to the 2006 elections the party selected its list via a more restrictive organ of party delegates), its supporters' satisfaction levels with democracy (as appears in the Israeli National Elections Surveys) increased from a mean of 2.36 in 2006 to 2.56 in 2009. This

difference is in the hypothesized direction (such that when Likud selects via primaries its supporters are more satisfied with democracy) and is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Likewise, Kadima supporters expressed higher satisfaction levels with democracy, when the party used primaries prior to the 2009 elections (2.55), compared to the supporters' satisfaction levels prior to the 2006 elections when the party selected via the most restrictive procedure (2.48)²². Since we cannot affirm causation using cross-temporal variation in selection processes, we also intend to use a survey experiment of conjoint analysis, to examine the relative importance of democratized candidate selection processes (relative to other attributes) for respondent's tendency to vote for and trust the party, as well as their overall evaluation of a country's democracy²³.

Many scholars theorize and provide empirical support for the notion that increase in the scope of the selectorate and especially adopting primaries brings negative consequences for parties themselves, and democracy in general. Democratized selection procedures intensify intra-party competition and intra-party disagreements, hamper the representativeness of the party's ballot, lower participation rates in the selection processes itself, decreases parties' unity level and cohesion scores, and even lower the vote share a party receives in the general elections (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Kernell, 2013). Our paper, however, discovers one important positive consequence for democratic selection processes: namely they bare positive association to citizens' overall satisfaction with democracy. It might be that just the *perception* of a democratic intra-party processes, although it may not really *be* more democratic, helps improve citizens' evaluation of democracy. Nonetheless, it is evident that the public welcomes open democratic candidate selection processes. Citizens seem to favor representatives that won their nominations on the basis of a broader popular appeal (e.g. among party members or even registered citizens), as they feel they can hold these representatives more accountable, compared to representatives, who are selected with a more exclusive selection process, and who are thus only accountable to a small party elite.

²² We of course stress that these examples are mere illustrations of the theory and not an official test of it.

²³ To further continue exploring whether candidate selection processes affect citizens' political attitudes and behaviors we are going to extend the analysis and examine other outcome variables. To begin with, we will focus our attention on institutional trust variables, such as citizens' trust in parties, the parliament and the government. We also want to examine whether and how democratic intra-party candidate selection processes affect citizens' interest levels in politics, their tendency to talk about political events with their relatives and friends, and their levels of political efficacy.

Thus, while earlier research has mainly stressed the dangers and dilemmas of intraparty democracy, this contribution suggests that parties can be promoters of democratic attitudes among citizens by means of internal party democratization (if causality is proven by future research). Put differently, internal democracy enhances external democracy, since democratic attitudes such as satisfaction with democracy are vital for the well-functioning of representative democracies. Since satisfaction with democracy is quintessential for democratic flourish and thrive one cannot afford overlooking parties in general and candidate selections' effect in particular, specifically in light of the ability to use democratized selection procedures to facilitate citizens' positive democratic attitudes, especially in times when they are in decline.

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


Fig. 1 Distribution of satisfaction with democracy in 28 country-sessions

Table 1: Selection Effect on Satisfaction with Democracy- Cross National Analysis

Parameter		Selectorate and Decentralization Index β (P-value)	Selectorate and Decentralization treatment contrast β (P-value)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>			
	Intercept	2.524 (<0.001)	2.515 (<0.001)
	Selectorate	0.073 (0.050)	
	Decentralization	0.048 (0.223)	
	Delegates		0.145 (0.016)
	Primaries		0.192 (0.008)
	National+Local		0.106 (0.144)
	Local		0.030 (0.653)
	Party Size	0.000 (0.515)	0.000 (0.413)
	Coalition	0.197 (<0.001)	0.191 (<0.001)
	AVDM	0.004 (0.610)	0.004 (0.652)
	AVDM^2	-0.000 (0.383)	-0.000 (0.405)
	SMD	-0.333 (0.087)	-0.336 (0.089)
	Mixed Systems	-0.242 (0.050)	-0.224 (0.077)
	Strong Preferential List Systems	-0.263 (0.012)	-0.256 (0.019)
	Weak Preferential List Systems	-0.285 (0.008)	-0.279 (0.012)
	No pool at party level systems	-0.114 (0.332)	-0.110 (0.365)
	GDP/Capita	0.000 (<0.001)	0.000 (<0.001)
	New-democracy	0.226 (0.040)	0.193 (0.081)
	Age	-0.007 (<0.001)	-0.007 (<0.001)
	Age2	0.000 (>0.001)	0.000 (<0.001)
	Gender	-0.059 (<0.001)	-0.059 (<0.001)
<i>Variance Components</i>			
<i>Country Level</i>			
	Intercept	0.100 (<0.001)	0.102 (<0.001)
<i>Party Level</i>			
	Intercept	0.157 (<0.001)	0.155 (<0.001)
	Residual	0.683	0.683
n. individuals		21,805	21,805
n. parties		130	130
n. country-session		28	28

Table 2: Selection Effect on Satisfaction with Democracy: Israel and Belgium

Parameter	Israel index β (P-value)	Israel treatment contrast β (P-value)	Belgium Index β (P-value)	Belgium treatment contrast β (P-value)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>				
Intercept	2.102 (<0.001)	2.102 (>0.001)	2.208 (<0.001)	2.185 (<0.001)
Selectorate	0.174 (0.066)		0.099 (0.069)	
Decentralization	-0.095 (0.497)		-0.110 (0.010)	
Delegates		0.174 (0.066)		0.130 (0.362)
Primaries		0.253 (0.027)		0.230 (0.104)
National+Local				-0.026 (0.727)
Local				-0.217 (0.009)
Party Ideology	-0.057 (0.199)	-0.057 (.199)	0.009 (0.774)	-0.006 (0.886)
Coalition	0.142 (0.057)	0.142 (0.057)	0.041 (0.511)	0.021 (0.727)
Education	-0.001 (0.773)	-0.001 (0.773)	0.065 (<0.001)	0.065 (<0.001)
Income	0.033 (0.029)	0.033 (0.029)	0.014 (0.028)	0.014 (0.027)
Age	-0.015 (0.001)	-0.015 (0.001)	-0.010 (0.005)	-0.010 (0.005)
Age2	0.000 (<0.001)	0.000 (<0.001)	0.000 (0.014)	0.000 (0.014)
Gender	-0.035 (0.218)	-0.035 (0.218)	-0.109 (<0.001)	-0.109 (>0.001)
<i>Variance Components</i>				
Intercept	0.197 (0.039)	0.197 (0.039)	0.159 (<0.001)	0.159 (<0.001)
Residual	0.714	0.714	0.767	0.767
n. individuals	2627	2627	9215	9215
n. parties	32	32	40	40